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CREATING A VIRAL FEDERAL
PRIVACY STANDARD
A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN*
Abstract: National identification ("ID") cards appear increasingly inevi-
table. National ID cards have the potential to be repressive and privacy-
destroying, but it is also possible to design a system that captures more
benefits than costs. Because the United States currently lacks a single, re-
liable credential, private businesses have trouble authenticating their cus-
tomers and matching data among distributed databases. This Article ar-
gues that the desire for reliable ID creates a window of opportunity for
the federal government to strike a bargain: offer private businesses the
use of a reliable credential in the form of a national ID card, on the con-
dition that they abide by a privacy standard set and owned by the United
States. But the government must act quickly-the Real ID Act of 2005,
which sets up a national standard for the issuance of state driver's li-
censes, is poised to become effective in May 2008. This law does not pro-
vide for privacy protections, and once it goes into effect the opportunity
to leverage such protections on a national ID card will be greatly reduced.
INTRODUCTION
There is a narrow window of opportunity for the creation of a
simple federal identification ("ID") standard that, if properly de-
signed, could have substantial privacy-enhancing properties for pri-
vate sector uses of personal information. If we hurry, the govern-
ment's standard-setting powers can be used to enhance privacy
protections for holders of a hypothetical enhanced (and even manda-
tory) national ID card. The key to this apparent paradox is a bargain
enforced by legislation: the government issues a secure credential and
takes on the substantial effort of initially verifying the identity of ap-
plicants. It produces a card or other token with standardized and eas-
ily-verified identifiers, and assigns each person an identifier-a gov-
ernment-standard index number akin to a Social Security number
("SSN"). Businesses will find the authenticating features of the card
* © 2006 A. Michael Froomkin. Professor, University of Miami School of Law. I would
like to thank Caroline Bradley and the participants in the 2006 Boston College Law Review
Owning Standards symposium for their thoughtful comments.
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attractive, and-at least until private-sector data management tech-
niques improve-should find the opportunity to use the index num-
ber to organize and share data about consumers attractive as well.
By keeping ownership and control of the identification standard,'
and especially the unique ID numbers, the government would be able
to set privacy-enhancing conditions on the private sector's use of the
card. No one would be required to participate, but only those firms
agreeing to abide by a set of federally-determined national privacy rules
would be allowed to use these authenticating, taxpayer-funded creden-
tials, and in particular to store the new ID number or to use it to organ-
ize their customer data. Furthermore, participating firms would only be
allowed to share any data ever assembled or organized with the aid of
that index number with other firms who had agreed to be bound by
the same national privacy rules-in effect, a viral privacy provision.
If any privacy-enhancing federal standard is to be effective, it needs
to be adopted soon. Otherwise, we risk ending up with the worst of
both worlds: mandatory ID cards and less privacy. Already, we face two
onrushing deadlines, one from the market and one from the states and
Congress. Competing market-based standards are slowly emerging, and
sooner or later the almost inevitable network effects will create an en-
trenched user base whose market and political clout would make
change via a new credential even more unlikely. Meanwhile, Congress
has already laid the groundwork for an unhappy result by passing the
REAL ID Act of 2005 ("REAL ID") 2 while giving little if any thought to
how the credentials it mandates will likely be used in the private sector,
much less to the long-run effects on personal privacy.
This Article's inquiry into the use of government power to man-
date pro-privacy ID card standards is part of a larger project on the
possible uses and abuses of national ID cards. Thus, it may be helpful
to begin by summarizing the most relevant parts of the overall argu-
ment of which the claims in this Article form a part.3 National ID
I Who should own and control both the data on the card and the data associated with
the card are separate questions.
2 The REAL ID Act of 2005 was enacted as part of the 2005 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief. Pub. L.
No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302 (codified in scattered sections of 8 and 49 U.S.C.A.);
infra notes 115-134 and accompanying text.
3 My object in providing this summary is less to persuade the reader of the accuracy of
what may seem to be controversial claims-a task I plan to undertake elsewhere-than it is
to provide context that may explain why I believe that, far from being as dry and hypo-
thetical as they may seem, national ID card standards are actually an important, even ur-
gent, issue.
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cards are a surprisingly emotional subject for many, conjuring mental
images of black-and-white movies featuring jack-booted soldiers with
fierce dogs and large guns moving down the aisles of trains and saying
"papers, please" in Hollywood German accents. I should start, there-
fore, by stating that I am not arguing that national ID cards are inher-
ently good, but nor do I find them inherently evil. My claim is that
given the forces pushing for them, some form of national ID is likely
to emerge soon (and that a "virtual ID card" almost exists already) 4
and that if we are going to have a debate about them it should be in-
formed by a richer understanding of their potential costs and bene-
fits. Furthermore, the extent to which any national ID card regime is,
on balance, a good or bad thing depends critically on how it is de-
signed. It is clearly possible to design national ID cards that are pri-
vacy-destroying and can be enlisted in a program of national repres-
sion. With care, however, it may be possible to design a system that
captures more benefits than costs.
Evaluating the overall costs and benefits of ID cards, especially as
regards their effects on freedom and privacy, requires careful atten-
tion to several factors beyond the scope of this paper, among them
the interactions between public and private uses of ID cards, who has
authority to use or demand an ID card, who determines what data is
on the card, how it is secured, and who can access that data. One
must also be sensitive to what one selects as a baseline for comparison.
In a privacy nirvana, ID cards would have no place. If, however, one
takes the baseline to be current practices rather than what one wishes
current practices were, it may be possible that the right sort of ID
cards would, on balance, contribute to personal privacy. Both the pos-
sible public and the possible private uses of a national ID card raise
tough questions. Proposals for a national ID card often focus on the
(alleged) advantages to law enforcement, prevention of terrorism,
public benefits, voter authentication, public health, and the delivery
of various other public services. Each of these applications raises
complex and controversial issues.
This Article, however, addresses a key element of the private sector
issues. Although these issues are not easily resolved, they are refreshingly
straightforward by comparison to some of the public sector applications.
4 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Uneasy Case for National ID Cards 18-27 (Mar. 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://personal.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/
IDI.pdf) (arguing that the ability to link distributed databases of personal information,
such as credit ratings, driver's licenses, SSNs, and even DNA, has already created a patch-
work version of a national ID).
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I. SOME CONTEXT
A discussion of the costs and benefits of a standardized national
ID card begins with a clear understanding of current conditions, the
baseline for comparing the merits of any proposal. As described fur-
ther below, the United States currently uses a mix of identity docu-
ments, each of which has serious flaws and limitations. 5 These limita-
tions cause difficulties for firms seeking to authenticate customers, as
well as for those trying to do data matching among distributed data-
bases. The very confusion those firms experience is itself a limited pri-
vacy-enhancing feature of the system. It seems inevitable, however,
that data matching will continue to improve in ways that make it un-
wise to put much faith in these transaction costs as the basis for long-
term data privacy protection.
Although national ID cards are common in many parts of the
world, 6 it is an article of faith in many quarters that the United States
does not have one. In fact, rather than one ID card we have many: nota-
bly, voter ID cards, SSNs, driver's licenses, and credit cards, to name only
the most common. Each type of ID was created for a limited purpose,
and each is significantly flawed or insecure. As businesses and govern-
ment have felt a greater need to find a way to authenticate individuals
and associate them with existing records, the private sector has come to
rely on existing forms of government-issued identification. In particular,
SSNs and driver's licenses have gradually become semi-official national
identity documents; the other major civilian federal identity credential,
the passport, is rarely if ever used for private transactions other than oc-
5 See infra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
6 SeeJulia Scheeres, ID Cards Are de Rigueur Worldwide, WIRED NEWS, Sept. 25, 2001,
http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,47073,00.html (quoting Privacy International
director Simon Davies as saying, "It's safe to say that the majority of countries have some
kind of national identification system"); see also Privacy International, Identity Cards: Fre-
quently Asked Questions, http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtnl?cmd[347] =x-
347-61881&als[theme] =National%201D%20Cards (last visited Oct. 23, 2006) (listing coun-
tries with ID cards).
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casionally to demonstrate citizenship status for employment. 7 Indeed,
fewer than one in three U.S. citizens has a passport.8
Although perhaps not formally mandatory, SSNs are necessary if
one wishes to take paid employment or participate in the banking sys-
tem. Cars are a practical necessity for most Americans who live outside
the largest urban areas, making a driver's license a practical necessity
for most as well. A government-produced ID is currently demanded for
travel not only behind the wheel of a car, but also as a passenger on air-
lines, trains, intercity buses, and even local buses.9 Although such de-
mands are increasingly common, their legal status remains debated. In
2006, in Gilmore v. Gonzales, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit rejected a claim that the enactment and enforcement of
the U.S. government's airline passenger identification policy violate the
constitutional right to travel and the First and Fourth Amendments. 10
The court rejected the petitioner's claim "because the Constitution
does not guarantee the right to travel by any particular form of trans-
portation."11 The panel also observed that "the identification policy's
'burden' is not unreasonable." 12 Importantly, however, the panel reached
this conclusion only after characterizing the regulatory scheme as one
that "requires that airline passengers either present identification or be
7 U.S. employers must complete an INS Form 1-9, Employment Eligibility Verification
Form, for every new hire, verifying that they have checked that the new employee is eligible
to work in the United States. See Verification of Employment Eligibility, 8 C.FR. § 274a.2
(2006), amended by Electronic Signature and Storage of Form 1-9, Employment Eligibility
Verification, 71 Fed. Reg. 34,510 (June 15, 2006); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a) (1) (B), (b)
(2000) (prohibiting employers from hiring workers without verifying their identity and au-
thorization to work in the United States). A U.S. passport is one of the forms of ID employers
may use to satisfy that duty. § 1324a(b) (1) (B) (i).
8 An adult passport is valid for ten years, a child's for five years. Bureau of Consumer Af-
fairs, U.S. Department of State, Frequently Asked Questions: Passports and Citizenship
Documents, http://travel.state.gov/passport/fri/faq/faq-1741.html (last visited Nov 2,
2006). During the last ten years, the United States issued between 5.5 and 10.1 million pass-
ports per fiscal year. Bureau of Consumer Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Passport Statis-
tics, http://travel.state.gov/passport/services/stats/stats_890.html (last visited Nov. 2,
2006). Even if all of those passports were issued to adults, the number would still total less
than one-third of the U.S. population. Cf Phil Gyford's Website, http://www.gyford.com
(Jan. 31, 2003, 17:14 EST) (describing the difficulty of estimating the number of U.S. pass-
ports in circulation).
9 See PapersPlease.org, United States v. Deborah Davis, http://www.papersplease.org/
davis/facts.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2006) (recounting demands by Denver police for ID
from passengers on a municipal bus route that crosses the Denver Federal Center).
10 435 F.3d 1125, 1136-39 (9th Cir. 2006); see U.S. CONST. amend. I, LV; Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (recognizing a constitutional right to interstate
travel), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
11 Gilmore, 435 F.3d at 1136.
12 Id. at 1137.
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subjected to a more extensive search."'13 Thus, whether the government
can require ID as a condition of air travel is still an open question. At
present, however, the question remains somewhat academic, as few pas-
sengers are prepared to endure significant hassle, delay, and even pos-
sible arrest for failing to show ID when asked.
Many private-sector transactions, particularly those that involve
the creation of an ongoing relationship or obligation, also involve the
exchange of identification data, including name, address, telephone
number, and SSN or driver's license number. Together, these data or-
dinarily permit the merchant to link a customer to transaction and
credit histories maintained by commercial data brokers such as Ex-
perian and ChoicePoint. 14 Merchants' reasons for requesting ID often
depend on the nature of the transaction. For example, by associating
a consumer with a set of records such as a credit history, a business
can estimate the likelihood of current or future payment. Verifying
address and employment information provides some guarantee of
recovery by suit or garnishment if payments stop. And, in other types
of transactions, the firm may be required to do a records check to
comply with regulatory requirements such as "know your customer"
rules in financial transactions. 15 In the absence of a regulatory duty,
the firm's primary motive may be to enable demographic analysis of
the customer database, or to permit future targeted marketing.
The databases maintained by private firms on U.S. persons are re-
markably large. Experian, for example, brags that its "North America
databases contain more than 65 terabytes (65 trillion bytes) of data"
including "credit information on approximately 215 million U.S. con-
sumers and more than 15 million U.S. businesses" and "demographic
information on approximately 215 million consumers in 110 million
living units across the United States."'16
13 Id. (both emphases added).
14 ChoicePoint describes itself as "the nation's leading provider of identification and
credential verification services." ChoicePoint Home Page, http://uww.choicepoint.com
(last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
15 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(s) (2000) (requiring federal banking agencies to prescribe
regulations requiring depository institutions to establish and maintain procedures rea-
sonably designed to ensure and monitor compliance with the Currency and Foreign
Transactions Reporting Act, 31 U.S.C.A. § 5311 (2006)); Financial Record-Keeping and
Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions, 31 C.F.R. § 103 (2006).
16 Experian, Corporate Fact Sheet, http://www.experian.com/corporate/factsheet.html
(last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
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These large databases contain many inaccuracies.17 And from a
firm's perspective, the process of matching a given person with the
right set of records can be quite difficult, especially if the person has a
common name.18 There are many John Smiths in the United States.
Between data entry errors, and inconsistent methods of data acquisi-
tion, firms' records can get mixed up. 19 Pulling together an accurate
set of data regarding a given person becomes even more difficult when
dealing with distributed databases. 20 In theory, as data storage gets
cheaper and electronic communication becomes almost costless, it
should be easy to tie together disparate sets of records to produce a
single, giant, virtual dossier about each of us. But in fact it is not easy,
which is why firms like Experian and ChoicePoint have something
valuable to sell.
The authentication problem exists in part because there is not at
present a particularly reliable identity credential. The existing Social
Security cards, U.S. driver's licenses, and even passports are known to
have been issued in a manner that does not provide enormous reli-
ability. SSNs are easy to share and to fake; the most recent study, now
almost a decade old, estimated that 10 million of the 269 million valid
SSNs in use were duplicates, often due to fakery or human error.21
17 See Colin Beasty, Cleaning a 75 Million Name Database, DESTINATIONCRM.coM, Dec.
1, 2005, http://www.destinationcrm.com/articles/default.asp?ArticlelD=5596&TopiclD-4
("With 75 million customers, Meredith Corp., a provider of magazines, books, television
broadcasting, and integrated marketing, was bound to have duplicate and inaccurate cus-
tomer information in its customer database-a problem, especially when trying to cross- and
up-sell products.").
18 See GEOFF HOLLOWAY & MIKE DUNKERLEY, THE MATH, MYTH AND MAGIC OF NAME
SEARCH AND MATCHING 11-12 (5th ed. 2004).
19 See id. at 51.
20 See id.
21 SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUBL'N No. 12-002, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON OPTIONS FOR ENHANC-
ING THE SOCIAL SECURITY CARD (1997), http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/ssnreport.html;
see IDs-NoT THAT EASY: QUESTIONS ABOUT NATIONWIDE IDENTITY SYSTEMS 36-37 (Stephen
T. Kent & Lynette I. Millet eds., 2002) [hereinafter IDs-NOT THAT EASY]. The percentage of
shared SSNs could be lower today, although the fraction due to fraud is certainly higher. Al-
though the Social Security Administration (the "SSA") has never issued the same number to
two wage earners as a practice, the SSA in the past sometimes used the same nnmber---often
with the suffix "A" attached-to identify both the wage earner and a relative (such as a spouse
or child) who had never worked but was receiving benefits due to the wage earner's work re-
cord. See Yigal Rechtman, Social Security Administration & Genealogy (July 2001), http://
members.aol.com/rechtman/ssafaq.html. This practice ended in the mid-1970s, id., but those
numbers inevitably lived on in both public and private record systems; as those beneficiaries
die out, the major cause of nonfraudulent number sharing should die with them.
The SSA collects $17 billion per year in payroll tax payments for which valid SSNs
cannot be found, see Latino Pundit, http://www.latinopundit.com (Mar. 12, 2006, 19:24
EST), which suggests that there are many fake numbers used by undocumented aliens.
2007]
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Currently, providing a domestic birth certificate, a registration fee,
and some evidence of a local address is more than enough to acquire a
driver's license in most states; providing a driver's license, another fee,
and a certified birth certificate suffices for a passport. 22 Although mod-
ern practices are improving, birth certificates have traditionally been
anything but standardized, issued by hospitals with no federal and usu-
ally little state regulation.23 As a result, a person (or machine) pre-
sented with a birth certificate is hard put to tell if it is authentic, much
less if it is accurate; like driver's licenses and passports, birth certificates
are not standardized, so that determining whether a particular cer-
tificate is authentic requires substantial research. 24 Nor are these docu-
ments strongly linked to the owner, which enables several people to
present one ID as their own. 25 What is more, ID-issuing agencies do not
guard very heavily against counterfeiting. 26
The authentication problem is particularly important in certain
sectors, such as the financial sector, where the consumer takes on a
long-term obligation of some sort. It also matters in employment rela-
tionships where the employee requires a special degree of trust or a
background check, such as daycare. For many firms, however, particu-
larly those whose primary interest in personal data is to enhance their
marketing efforts, the data-matching problem is the key. For these
firms, the authentication problem is that even when consumers iden-
tify themselves, they do not do so in a consistent manner.27
Difficult as it may be to do a high-quality job, there is clearly a lot
of data matching occurring in the United States. Experian, for exam-
ple, "provides address information for more than 20 billion promo-
tional mail pieces to more than 100 million households every year," and
total sales exceed $1.3 billion per year.28 And, at present, it is happen-
ing without much privacy protection for the people whose information
is being sorted and traded. There are very few national limits on the
sharing of private transactional data collected by persons not classified
as professionals. Perhaps the most important are the Health Insurance
22 See Bureau of Consumer Affairs, U.S. Department of State, How to Apply in Person for a
Passport, http://travel.state.gov/passport/get/first/first_- 830.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
23 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIRTH CER-
TIFICATE FRAUD 2 (2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-07-99-00570.pdf.
24 Id.; see IDs-NOT THAT EASY, supra note 21, at 30.
25 IDs-NoT THAT EASY, supra note 21, at 30.
26 Id.
27 On authentication generally, see WHO GOES THERE? AUTHENTICATION THROUGH
THE LENS OF PRIVACY 33-54 (Stephen T. Kent & Lynette I. Millett eds., 2003).
28 Experian, supra note 16.
(Vol. 48:55
Creating a Viral Federal Privacy Standard
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") 29 and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act.30 HIPAA creates a new regime of privacy regula-
tions, including a requirement that patients specifically agree to re-
leases of their medical information.3 1 The Fair Credit Reporting Act, in
addition to having rules designed to make credit reports more accu-
rate, also has a few rules prohibiting credit bureaus from making cer-
tain accurate statements about aged peccadilloes, although even this
statute of limitations does not apply to reports requested for larger
transactions. 3 2 There are a few other federal data privacy protections.
The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 forbids cable operators
and third parties from monitoring the viewing habits of subscribers. 33
Cable operators must tell subscribers what personal data is collected
and, in general, may not disclose it to anyone without the subscriber's
consent.34 The "Bork Bill," formally known as the Video Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1988, also prohibits most releases of customers' video rental
2 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No..104-191,
110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.).
30 Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000 & Supp. III 2003).
31 The revised HIPAA regulations can be found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2006). Two
works can provide to the reader a useful introduction to HIPAA. See Diane Kutzko et al.,
H1PAA in Real Time: Practical Implications of the Federal Privacy Rule, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 403,
410-36 (2003); Susan T. House & John R. Price, HIPAA: How Ill Are My Documents, and
Whom May I Tell About It?, Presentation Before the American College of Trust and Estate
Counsel in San Antonio, Texas 1-4 (Mar. 11, 2004), available at http://d2d.ali-aba.org/_files/
thumbs/rtf/0-Hose-HIPAAthumb.pdf.
Many parts of HIPAA are enormously controversial and have faced a wide range of cri-
tiques. See generally Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace:
Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health Information, 48 B.C. L. REv. (forthcoming
Mar. 2007); Meredith Kapushion, Comment, Hungry, Hungry HIPAA: When Privacy Regula-
tions Go Too Far, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2004); David R. Morantz, Comment, HIPAA's
Headaches: A Call for a First Amendment Exception to the Newly Enacted Health Care Privacy Rules,
53 U. KAN. L. REv. 479 (2005); Marie C. Pollio, Note, The Inadequacy of HIPAA's Privacy
Rule: The Plain Language Notice of Privacy Practices and Patient Understanding, 60 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. ANt. L. 579 (2004).
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a), which prohibits reporting of bankruptcies that are more
than ten years old; reporting of "[c]ivil suits, civil judgments, and records of arrest that,
from date of entry, antedate the report by more than seven years or until the governing
statute of limitations has expired, whichever is the longer period"; reporting of tax liens
paid seven or more years earlier; and reporting of other noncriminal adverse information
that is more than seven years old. None of the prohibitions apply if the transaction for
which the report will be used exceeds $150,000, or the job on offer pays more than
$75,000 per year. Id. § 1681c(b); see also id. § 1681k(a)(2) (requiring that consumer credit
reporting agencies have procedures in place to verify the accuracy of public records con-
taining information adverse to the data subject).
33 See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. § 551 (b) (2000 & Supp. III
2003).
34ld. § 551 (a) (1), (c).
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data.35 There are also an increasing number of state data privacy rules,
notably rules requiring disclosure of breaches after they occui; 6
Meanwhile, four complementary developments are creating a
virtual national ID system. First, a number of legislative initiatives have
required the creation of (ostensibly) special-purpose databases, each
of which covers a substantial fraction of the population. 37 Second, in-
creased use of credit and debit cards, store loyalty cards, web-based
marketing, and other private initiatives has allowed retailers and
financial intermediaries to amass great amounts of data on consum-
ers. 38 Third, both private and government actors have taken advan-
tage of decreasing costs in camera and other sensor technology to in-
stall an expanding base of monitoring equipment on both public and
private property.3 9 Fourth, advances in computer storage and net-
working technology have made it vastly cheaper to store, search, and
share the gigabytes of data resulting from these developments. 40 The
result is a hybrid public-private system in which a very great amount of
information about almost every U.S. resident is available for a small
fee. Much of this information is currently distributed on separate
networks, but the technology to tie them together exists. 41
II. ENLISTING THE GOVERNMENT'S STANDARDS-MAKING POWER TO
CREATE VIRAL PRIVACY
Any future national ID card will be driven, in the main, by gov-
ernmental aims. The justifications offered at various times include:
(1) the hope that a secure credential would make it easier to validate
citizenship and visa status and thus make undocumented immigrants
unemployable, which in turn may reduce the incentive to enter the
35 Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (2000). The Act allows
videotape rental providers to release customer names and addresses to third parties wish-
ing to market their products to customers so long as there is no disclosure of titles pur-
chased or rented, Id. Customers can, however, be grouped into categories by the type of
film they rent. See id. § 2710(b) (2) (D) (ii).
36 See Satish M. Kini & James T. Shreve, Notice Requirements: Common Themes and Differ-
ences in the Regulatory and Legislative Responses to Data Security Breaches, 10 N.C. BANKING
INST. 87, 92-103 (2006) (identifying, comparing, and contrasting state laws).
37 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1472-73
(2000) (discussing government databases).
38 See id. at 1474.
39 See id. at 1476-82.
40 See id. at 1468-69.
41 See id.
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country illegally;42 (2) claims that ID cards would help the fight against
terrorism; 43 (3) improved delivery of government services, notably
transfer payments and other government benefit programs;44 (4) im-
proved voter registration and identification; 45 and (5) assistance to
42 See, e.g.,John J. Miller & Stephen Moore, A National ID System: Big Brother's Solution to
Illegal Immigration, CATO PoCY ANALYSIS No. 237 (Cato Inst., Washington, D.C.), Sept. 7,
1995, at I (noting that, without national ID cards, a national computer worker registry
system would not work); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Op-Ed., Hidden America, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 10,
2006, at 60 (arguing that Congress should create a more reliable ID card system and en-
forcement mechanisms to prevent employers from hiring illegal immigrants).
43 See, e.g., Ben Quarmby, iBrief, The Case for National DNA Identification Cards, 2003
DUKE L. & TECH. Riv. 2, 24-25, http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/2003
dltr0002.html ("At times like these, it is therefore crucial not only for the law enforcement
authorities and the government, but also for private entities such as commercial airlines,
public transport companies, weapons retailers, and others, to be able to accurately identify
all individuals."); Charlie Savage, Congress Set to Impose ID Card Rules-States Would Need to
Verify Papers, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5, 2005, at Al (noting that the REAL ID Act was
"[t]outed as an antiterrorism measure").
In fact, the claim that ID cards help fight terrorism is highly debatable. See Marc Ro-
tenberg, REAL ID, Real Trouble?, COMM. OF THE ACM, Mar. 2006, at 128, 128 ("Systems of
identification remain central to many forms of security. But designing secure systems that
do not introduce new risks is proving more difficult than many policymakers had imag-
ined."); Bruce Schneier, Op-Ed., A National ID Card Wouldn't Make Us Safer, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Apr. 1, 2004, at A17 ("[E]verything I've learned about security over the last
20 years tells me that once it is put in place, a national ID card program will actually make
us less secure."); Chad Vander Veen, Papers Please, Gov'T TECH., Nov. 2005, http://www.
govtech.net/magazine/story.php?id=97147&issue=1 1:2005 ("[O]f the 9/11 terrorists, as
many as seven carried Florida drivers' licenses and at least four carried Virginia drivers'
licenses, which obviously calls into question the effectiveness of those states' driver's li-
cense security measures prior to Sept. 11, 2001.").
44 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ELECTRONIC BENEFITS TRANSFER: USE OF Bio-
METRICS TO DETER FRAUD IN THE NATIONWIDE EBT PROGRAM 9-10 (1995) (recommend-
ing electronic fingerprint identification as a condition for receipt of government benefits);
Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the Grand Inquisitor: The Central Role of Verification Pro-
cedures in Means-Tested Welfare Programs, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 663, 664-65 (2005)
(noting the importance of computer matching to detect benefit fraud); Amitai Etzioni,
Op-Ed, You'll Love Those National ID Cards, CH RSTIAN SC1. MONITOR, Jan. 14, 2004, at 11
(arguing that national ID cards would greatly curtail tax and welfare fraud); Samantha
Maiden &James Riley, ID Card Plan for Health, Welfare, AUSTRALIAN, Mar. 27, 2006, at Local
1 (reporting on Australian government proposal to issue "a health and welfare smart card
to save on postage and prevent billions of dollars being lost to fraud and identity theft");
Stephen O'Brien, Outrage over ID Cards to Beat Welfare Fraud, SUNDAY TIMES (Ireland), Aug.
14, 2005, available at http:/ /ww.timesonline.co.nuk/article/0,,2091-1734736,00.html (re-
porting Ireland's Social Affairs Minister as saying ID cards would be "designed to combat
up to £600m a year in welfare fraud").
45 Cf Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, No. 1:05-CV-0634-SEB-VSS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20321, at *114-83 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 14, 2006) (rejecting constitutional and statutory challenge
to Indiana law requiring that most voters present valid, government-issued photo ID card in
order to vote); Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, 406 F Supp. 2d 1326, 1376-77 (N.D. Ga.
2005) (granting preliminary injunction precluding Georgia from enforcing its statutory
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law enforcement. 46 There has been discussion of both the purported
government benefits and the concomitant risks, ranging from various
losses of liberty right up to the creation of an Orwellian state- al-
though I think that neither side has been sufficiently rigorous. 47
In light of the fact that businesses have used SSNs and driver's
licenses to identify and index consumers for decades, it would be fool-
ish to ignore how the private sector will use any new national iden-
tification credential. Indeed, it would be sensible to try to design that
credential in a way that met as many of the private sector's reasonable
requirements as possible while at the same time trying to provide
some systematic protection for personal privacy.
In the private sector, the advantages of a strong and reliable na-
tional identity credential most likely will fall in these areas: fraud pre-
vention, medical care, 48 e-commerce, and the linking of databases
with personal information about consumers. Excluding the special
circumstances surrounding health care data, 49 the things many firms
will most likely want to do relating to commercial transactions are
identify customers, learn a lot about them, and market to them. Rec-
onciling these market-oriented objectives with the protection of per-
sonal privacy may sound like a contradiction in terms. But if we act
quickly it need not be.
Firms seeking to correlate distributed data and use them to learn
more about their customers face three problems. First, they need to
authenticate customers-to establish that customers are in fact who
they say they are. Indeed, in cases where the firm's primary goal is
fraud prevention, authentication may be more important than any-
photo ID requirement in future elections), motion to stay preliminary injunction denied sub nom.
Common Cause/Georgia v. Cox, No. 05-15784-G (11th Cir. Oct. 27, 2005), available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.eclu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/ll thCircuitDenial.pdf.
46 See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, PHOTO LICENSES AND ID CARDS: SECURE
PROOF FOR DRIVERS AND NON-DRIVERS (2006), http://www.nydmv state.ny.us/broch/c-33.htm
(touting New York State photo ID on the grounds that it "may provide increased identification
security for you, plus law enforcement and driver safety advantages for everyone").
47 See Froomkin, supra note 4, at 4-17, 27-44.
48 In its original version, HIPAA contemplated a unique patient identifier to help or-
ganize disparate medical records. That idea was scrapped and the issue remains controver-
sial. See Nancy Ferris, Patient ID Is Trouble Spot for Commission, GOV'T HEALTH IT, Aug. 11,
2005, http://governmenthealthit.com/article89870-08-11-05-Web.
49 The medical care area presents special problems of both access and regulation. If an
ID card is going to carry information useful to first responders and especially emergency
medical caregivers, then that information needs to be accessible to a large and unpredict-
able population, raising issues qualitatively different from the market-oriented issues dis-
cussed in this paper. Furthermore, HIPAA has occupied the field of privacy regulation of
medical data, however unartfully.
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thing else. Second, firms need to distinguish that person from other
persons in the database who have the same 50 (or a similar) 51 name or
who have (or had) the same address. For example, the first time I
checked my credit history some employment data had bled in from a
Michael Froomkin in Ohio, a person previously unknown to me. Third,
when trying to tie distributed databases together, firms need a way to
ensure that the records they are linking are about the same person:
they have to make sure that each set of records is distinguished in a
compatible manner. In the case of an unusual name like "Froomkin"
this may not be too difficult, but there are many John Smiths in the
United States, not all of whom have or use middle initials, and many
of whom may live on Main Streets. In any case, the merchant's (or
data broker's) goal is to automate every step in the process to keep
the costs down.
A. The U.S. Government and the Power of Standards
The federal government has been in the standard-setting busi-
ness since the early days of the Republic. The Constitution, after all,
gives Congress the power to "fix the Standard of Weights and Meas-
ures,"52 which no less an authority than Joseph Story explained was
"for the sake of uniformity, and the convenience of commerce." 53
Thus, in addition to market-based standards, whether set by first mov-
ers, competitive victors, regulated or de facto monopolists, cartels,
anti-trust exempted industry bodies, or volunteers operating under
50 See Lisa Friedman, Paying for a Name: David Nelsons Draw Red Flags Getting Through
Airport Security, L.A. DAILY NEWS, June 15, 2003, at NI ("Throughout Southern California
and across the country, men named David Nelson report they have been harassed, ques-
tioned by FBI agents, pulled off airplanes, searched and then searched again when at-
tempting air travel. Apparently caught up in a nationwide dragnet for a terrorist by that
name, David Nelsons everywhere are being told their names raise red flags on airline
screening software.").
51 The U.S. government's well-publicized difficulties in running the "do not fly" list
demonstrate the nature of the problem. See, e.g., Sally B. Donnelly, You Say Yusuf ISay Yous-
souf ... , TI ME.COM, Sept. 25, 2004, http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,
702062,00.html ("[The incident where] the former Cat Stevens was denied entry into the
U.S. when federal officials determined he was on the government's 'no-fly' antiterror list,
started with a simple spelling error."); Leslie Miller, Babies Caught Up in "No-Fly" Confusion,
SFGATE.COM, Aug. 16, 2005, http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/n/a/2005/08/
15/national/w1I5806D06.DTL ("Infants have been stopped from boarding planes at air-
ports throughout the U.S. because their names are the same as or similar to those of possible
terrorists on the government's 'no-fly list.'").
5-2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
53 JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1117, at 20 (Fred B. Rothman Publ'ns 1991) (1883).
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conditions of near-Habermasian discourse, 54 there is a variety of ways
in which the government itself enforces standards.
Modern government standard setting encompasses much of the
modern regulatory state, including health and safety rules, disclosure
requirements, licensing laws, and much more. Sometimes the gov-
ernment adopts privately drafted industry standards as its own; 55
sometimes it writes on a blank slate. Similarly, if the government de-
fines a "safe harbor" as part of a regulatory scheme-for example, as
presumptively meeting a standard of care-this may in practice be-
come a standard.
But not all government standard setting is by mandatory rule.
Sometimes the government sets de facto private standards through
the exercise of its market power: when the government, acting either
by accident or design, sets a standard for its own volume purchases, it
can have a knock-on effect for private purchasers. Manufacturers
wanting to sell to the government produce goods that comply with
the standard. If the government purchases are large, and if the pro-
duction function for the good is one characterized by declining mar-
ginal costs, the effect of the volume sales to the government is a lower
market price for the government-standard goods as compared to simi-
lar but nonconforming products. The lower price makes the govern-
ment-standard goods more attractive to private buyers, and-so long
as there is not a significant quality disadvantage-a de facto private
sector standard emerges.
A great deal of both private and governmental standard setting is
likely to increase consumer welfare. 56 A standard can make families of
devices interoperable in ways that increase social welfare by promot-
ing competition. 57 "Interface" standards permit products made by
different manufacturers to work together; 58 infrastructural standards
such as railroad gauges or electricity voltages and cycles per second
enable entire industries. 59 A safety standard can provide a minimum
5 See generally A. Michael Froomkin, Haberrnas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749 (2003).
55 See generally Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organiza-
tions, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002) (surveying interactions, between standard-setting or-
ganizations and firms that claim ownership of industry standards, that occur in the shadow
of patent and antitrust laws).
56 Id. at 1896-97.
57 Id. at 1897.
58 Id. at 1893.
59 See id. at 1897.
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level of assurance and safety to the public, especially in circumstances
where information may be costly to acquire. 60
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the economic
benefits of a federally imposed standard cannot be assumed. For ex-
ample, there is substantial literature examining cases in which incum-
bents have "captured" the regulatory process and persuaded the gov-
ernment to use its standard-setting powers in ways that advantage the
incumbents and make entry difficult and expensive for competitors
with a new technology. 61 Arguably, the current push for government-
mandated "digital rights management" technologies, already backed
by the creation of paracopyright interests in the copy-protection tech-
nologies, 62 is another form of capture-driven standards policy in
which incumbents are trying to stifle disruptive technologies that
threaten their business models. 63
Additionally, even if it is not following an agenda driven by spe-
cial interests, the government's interest in making a standard may
have little to do with the sort of consumer welfare measured by
economists. For example, in the mid-1990s, the federal government
sought to stem the spread of strong cryptography by creating a de
facto standard around the Clipper Chip, a device that could be used
to encrypt telephone conversations with a cipher that was orders of
magnitude stronger than the increasingly vulnerable ciphers then
60 SeeLemley, supra note 55, at 1897-98.
61 For a compelling account of a contemporary misuse of standards to stifle competi-
tion, see generally Susan P. Crawford, The Ambulance, the Squad Car & the Internet, 21
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 873 (2006), which demonstrates how incumbent telecommunications
carriers persuaded the Federal Communications Commission to institute rules under the
guise of safety standards, disadvantaging VoIP-based competitors.
62 "Paracopyright" refers to copyright-like legal protections created in the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), that sanction content
users who defeat anticircumvention devices deployed by copyright owners in order to pre-
vent the reproduction of digital copies of their content. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVit) NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12A.18[B], at 12A-185 (2004); see also Stefan
Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J. COMp. L. 323,
338 (2004) (describing the traditional role of copyright as "react[ing] to significant
changes in technology").
63 See Brief of Amici Curiae Sixty Intellectual Property and Technology Law Professors
and the United States Public Policy Committee of the Association for Computing Machin-
ery in Support of Respondents, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545
U.S. 913 (2005) (No. 04-480), reprinted in 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 535, 559 (2005) (accus-
ing "petitioners and certain amid" of advocating rules under which "copyright holders
could effectively approve or deny new technologies that are disruptive to, or merely com-
petitive with, their business models").
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available for export. 64 Previously, the government had objected to
strong encryption on the grounds that it would stymie law enforce-
ment agencies (and intelligence agencies) with legitimate reasons to
eavesdrop on communications. 65 With the Clipper Chip, the govern-
ment offered the private sector a bargain: strong cryptography with a
built-in back door.66 The government would keep a copy of the keys-
the unique codes belonging to each chip-thus allowing it to retain
the ability to intercept every message sent using it. 67 The safeguards
against the U.S. government would be purely legal, not technologi-
cal. 68 As part of its effort to encourage the private sector to adopt
Clipper as its standard for secure communications, the U.S. govern-
ment proposed to buy substantial numbers of Clipperized phones for
its own use, thus jump-starting production. 69 The hope was that once
there were enough Clipperized telephones in use, network effects
would take over; Clipper would become the de facto standard and
every business interested in secure communications would think it
had no other choice. 70 The political resistance was so great that only
one manufacturer announced it would produce the phones, and in
fact that one company, AT&T, made very few of them. 71
6 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the
Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 752-64 (1995). There were no rules limiting the
strength of domestic cryptography, but the export control regime had prevented a stan-
dard from emerging.
65 See id. at 743-44.
66 See id. at 752.
67 See id.
6 The government set out relatively elaborate procedures that it said would reduce the
risk that the keys would be released to law enforcement agencies without legally sufficient
justification, such as a valid wiretap authorization. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Authorization
Procedures for Release of Encryption Key Components in Conjunction with Intercepts Pur-
suant to FISA (Feb. 4, 1994), available at http://www.epic.org/crypto/clipper/doj-key-
escrow_procedures.html; U.S. Dep't of Justice, Authorization Procedures for Release of En-
cryption Key Components in Conjunction with Intercepts Pursuant to State Statutes (Feb. 4,
1994), available at littp://www.epic.org/crypto/clipper/doj-key-escrow-procedures.html;
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Authorization Procedures for Release of Encryption Key Components
in Conjunction with Intercepts Pursuant to Title 11 (Feb. 4, 1994), available at http://
vww.epic.org/crypto/clipper/dojkey-escrowv-procedures.htnl.
69 See Froomkin, supra note 64, at 769-70.
70 See id. at 769.
71 SeeJared Sandberg & Don Clark, AT&T VLSI Technology to Develop Microchips That Of-
fer Data Security, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 1995, at A3 (noting that AT&T had originally sup-
ported the Clipper Chip but was now abandoning it).
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The Clipper Chip never really got off the ground, 72 but that fail-
ure was due to an unusually determined public opposition at home
and deep suspicion abroad. Non-U.S. users in particular did not want
to commit themselves to communications that could be acquired by
the U.S. government (and not their own).73 Ironically, the very im-
portance of an international standard that had allowed the United
States to use export control to influence domestic standards helped
doom the government's attempt to impose Clipper by market means.
But for these extraordinary circumstances, Clipper could have be-
come a standard. And there may be a lesson there.
Unlike encrypted communications, a national ID standard is by
definition purely domestic, 74 vastly increasing the power of the gov-
ernment to impose a standard. Indeed, at present the state and na-
tional governments remain the sole possible suppliers of identity cre-
dentials likely to be widely accepted in the marketplace; as discussed
below, the only serious competition for any federal ID card will come
from the new standardized state driver's licenses that will come into
production at some uncertain point in the next few years. 75
B. The Carrot
National data privacy policies arguably could be enforced directly
by federal statute. There are, however, two reasons why we should not
rely on Congress to do so. First, Congress has shown no inclination to
enact a broad, meaningful, and non-sectoral privacy statute. As noted
above, the United States has a few targeted national privacy rules, 76
but otherwise the federal policy is most often one of lip service 77
72 The Pentagon did announce plans to order a large quantity of its cousin, the CAP-
STONE card, for the Defense Messaging System, see Ellen Messmer, NIST Acknowledges Pat-
ent Infringement, NETWORK WORLD, July 25, 1994, at 20, but it is not clear how many were
actually purchased or deployed. See Bill Murray, 12 Years, $1.6 Billion and Counting,
FCW.com, Mar. 5, 2001, http://www.fcw.com/article72901 (noting the disarray of the De-
fense Messaging System and Department of Defense's increased reliance on software en-
cryption).
73 See A. Michael Froomkin, It Came from Planet Clipper: The Battle over Cryptographic Key
"Escrow, "1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 34-35.
74 If the credential were to double as a passport, then a number of international rules
would apply. There are also some international standards regarding the use of ID for visa
applications, but these do not affect the argument in the text.
75 See infra note 131 and accompanying text (noting that REAL ID will become effec-
tive in May 2008, but that many states have made it clear that this deadline is unrealistic).
76 See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
77 For instance, the United States endorsed the 1980 Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development data privacy guidelines twenty years ago. See Robert M. Gell-
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combined with unconvincing claims that state law and industry self-
regulation provide adequate privacy protection. 78 Indeed, for more
than thirty years Congress has avoided enacting any wide-ranging data
privacy protections, especially as regards data in private hands. 79 Re-
cent laws, such as the much-touted privacy provisions of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, are, in practice, weak.80 If
Congress cannot be persuaded to mandate a national data privacy re-
gime, the likely introduction of a new ID provides an occasion for a
bargain: give firms something valuable in exchange for their agree-
ment to comply with stiffened data privacy rules. Second, although it
man, Can Privacy Be Regulated Effectively on a National Level? Thoughts on the Possible Need for
International Privacy Rules, 41 VILL. L. REv. 129, 154-55 (1996) (noting endorsement by the
United States, but criticizing it as mostly lip service); infra notes 104-111 and accompany-
ing text. Indeed, a U.S. government agency issued one of the first reports on the need for
more attention to the privacy implications of computerized records. See SEC'v's ADVISORY
COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RE-
CORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS 48-50 (1973).
78 See Issuance of Safe Harbor Principles and Transmission to European Commission,
65 Fed. Reg. 45,666, 45,667 (July 24, 2000). Numerous works describe the United States-
European Union ("EU") safe harbor negotiations. See, e.g., Barbara Crutchfield et al., U.S.
Multinational Employers: Navigating Through the "Safe Harbor" Principles to Comply with the EU
Data Privay Directive, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 735, 781 (2001) (warning that compliance with EU
privacy rules "will require substantial changes in the way [U.S. firms] do business"); Sean
D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 95 Am. J.
INT'L L. 132, 156 (2001) (noting that "European negotiators resisted the U.S. proposal for
private sector self-regulation, proclaiming it to be little more than the 'fox guarding the
hen-house,' while U.S. negotiators resisted increased U.S. government monitoring of the
private sector"); David A. Castor, Note, Treading Water in the Data Privacy Age: An Analysis of
Safe Harbor's First Year, 12 IND. INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 265, 289-90 (2002) (praising U.S.
privacy legislation for lacking the scope of European rules); see also Ryan Moshell, Com-
ment, . . . And Then There Was One: The Outlook for a Self-Regulatory United States Amidst a
Global Trend Toward Comprehensive Data Protection, 37 TEX. TECH L. REv. 357, 388-432 (2005)
(surveying data-protection schemes in other nations, and arguing that the United States
should take a more active role in data protection rather than relying on self-regulation);
David Raj Nijhawan, Note, The Emperor Has No Clothes: A Critique of Applying the European
Union Approach to Privacy Regulation in the United States, 56 VAND. L. REV. 939, 958-75 (2003)
(arguing that an EU-style data-protection scheme wotld not work in the United States).
But see Gregory Shaffer, Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International
Rules in the Ratcheting Up of U.S. Privacy Standards, 25 YALEJ. INT'L L. 1, 55-88 (2000) (argu-
ing that U.S. privacy standards have become tougher due to pressure from the EU).
79 First Amendment limits on preventing persons from sharing what they know are one
constraining factor. See generally Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The
Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000)
(discussing the First Amendment implications of information privacy speech restrictions).
80 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2000); see Eric Poggemiller, Note, The
Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in Gramm-Leach-Bliley: Much Ado About Nothing?, 6
N.C. BANKING INST. 617, 628-35 (2002) (disctssing possible explanations for why the pri-
vacy provisions in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act have not been very effective).
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is clear that Congress has substantial power to regulate the commer-
cial use of personal data,81 there may be some First Amendment limits
to Congress's power to regulate the repetition of true statements.8 2
If we cannot rely on Congress to act directly, and if there are also
First Amendment doubts about Congress's power to make sufficiently
broad rules, then perhaps it would be better to try a carrot and stick
approach, one in which firms' participation in a national data privacy
regime is formally voluntary. In order to persuade firms to buy into a
formally voluntary scheme, however, there must be a carrot-some-
thing that firms want badly enough to buy into an enhanced set of
privacy rules.
Improved national ID cards would offer firms two things they
value: the prospects of solving both the authentication problem and the
distinction problem.8 3 The existence of an ID card is strong evidence
that the government believes it authenticated the person to whom it
issued the credential. For downstream users, the authentication pro-
vided by the card is at best as good as the quality of the evidence that
81 Although the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (the "DPPA") provides a model
of what federal regulation might look like, it is important to note that it is directed at state
agencies, not at the private sector. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000); see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S.
141, 143 (2000) (rejecting federalism challenge to the DPPA). Furthermore, the DPPA
contains numerous exceptions. States may release information for:
* Legitimate government agency functions, § 2721(b) (1);
* Use in matters of motor vehicle safety, theft, emissions, and product recalls, id.
§ 2721 (b) (2);
* Motor vehicle market research and surveys, id.;
* "Legitimate" business needs in transactions initiated by the individual to verify
accuracy of personal information, id. § 2721 (b) (3);
• Use in connection with a civil, criminal, administrative or arbitral proceeding, id.
§ 2721 (b) (4);
* Research activities and statistical reports, so long as personal information is not
disclosed or used to contact individuals, id. § 2721 (b) (5);
* Insurance activities, id. § 2721(b) (6);
* Notice for towed or impounded vehicles, id. § 2721(b) (7);
* Use by licensed investigators or security services, id. § 2721 (b) (8);
* Use by private toll transportation facilities, id. § 2721 (b)(10);
* Response to requests for individual records if the state has obtained express con-
sent from the individual, id. § 2721 (b)(11);
* Bulk marketing distribution if the state has obtained express consent from the
individual, id. § 2721 (b) (12);
* Use by any requester where the requester can show written consent of the indi-
vidual, id. § 2721 (b) (13); and
* Any other legitimate state use if it relates to motor vehicle or public safety, id.
§ 2721(b) (14).
82 SeeVolokh, supra note 79, at 1080-122.
83 See supra notes 17-28 and accompanying text.
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the government required to issue the ID. Subsequent possession of the
card suggests a link between the holder and the person to whom it was
issued, but the level of reliance that one is justified in placing on this
proffer depends on several factors, among them the ease with which
cards can be duplicated or altered. Unless the card is tamper-resistant
and hard to counterfeit, it will not be of much use to anyone.
A national ID card with biometric authentication offers a solution
to the authentication problem. Similarly, a new national identity cre-
dential offers the enticing possibility of a new numbering scheme that
could replace the nearly ubiquitous SSN with something harder to
fake and very likely to be unique. 4 What is more, if the card is gov-
ernment-mandated, then all the costs of original verification of the
information and the production of a secure card will be borne by the
card holder, either directly as a fee or indirectly as taxes. Either way,
neither the merchant nor the data broker has to pay, a price point
that both are likely to find pleasing. All other things being equal, one
would expect merchants and others to embrace the new card.
As one recent study of national identification systems stated:
A nationwide identity system, depending on its implementa-
tion, might drive many other forms of identification out of
use by subsuming their functionality. Several factors in par-
ticular could encourage widespread third-party reliance on
the nationwide identity system to the exclusion of current sys-
tems. First, if the cost of the system is borne by the govern-
ment and its associated agencies, the system's use would be
free to other segments of society unless measures (technical,
legal, or otherwise) are taken to prevent unauthorized use.
Second, unless private parties are prevented by law (or restric-
tions on technology) from relying on the nationwide identity
system, the liability associated with such reliance would be
shielded by the government's sovereign immunity. Third,
even if the private parties were forbidden to rely on the data,
it is very likely that private commercial organizations would
begin to correlate data about citizens based on their card
84 By using cryptographic techniques, the government can digitally sign not just the
number but also some fact about the card holder, such as a digitized photo. This will make
it very difficult to counterfeit or alter. If the information used in conjunction with the
number is something that could be known only to the genuine card holder or that is bio-
metrically unique to that person, the chance that a card could be forged or altered is min-
ute unless the entire encryption system for all cards is broken.
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and/or identity within the system. The information in these
commercial databases may not be as strongly protected (le-
gally or technologically) as, presumably, is the information in
the nationwide identity system's own databases. 8 5
Businesses will want to use a national ID card-the only questions are what
they will put up with to get it, and whether there will be close substitutes
that might do instead. The next two sections address these questions.
C. The (Viral) Stick
If firms find it beneficial to use a national ID card for authentica-
tion and especially for data indexing and matching, they should be
willing to accept a degree of expense or constraint regarding the way
that they manage the information created, verified, and indexed
thanks to this new technology. Thus, it should be politically feasible to
condition the use of the new national index number on adherence to
national data protection and privacy rules. The ownership and dis-
semination of private sector data would remain a matter of contract
and state law as it is today,86 but would be constrained by the third
party's duty to adhere to government-defined data protection rules
when using the federally owned ID number to index data, or even
when using any data that had been so indexed. 87
Meaningful privacy rules restricting the use of indexing informa-
tion, and the information indexed with it, will have to be set nationally.
Although this creates a focal point for regulation, it also inevitably cre-
ates a single point of policy failure, and a large target waiting for cap-
ture by industries that will want the minimum restrictions on their abil-
ity to process and share personal information. This is undoubtedly a
risk, but it is one that should be weighed against the "virtual" ID card
world currently being built, one in which the locations at which privacy-
destroying decisions occur are scattered and often invisible.88 Centraliz-
85 IDs-NOT THAT EASY, supra note 21, at 30-31.
86 As a general matter, and absent duties of confidentiality that fall primarily on pro-
fessionals such as lawyers and doctors, the facts of an economic transaction belong jointly
and severally to the parties. See Froomkin, supra note 37, at 1502.
87 The obligation to comply with data protection rules would thus run with the data, as
do the obligations tinder the European Data Protection Directive. See generally PAUL M.
SCHWARTZ &JOEL R. REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW (1996) (discussing the Directive);
infra note 94 (same).
88 See Froomkin, supra note 37, at 1468-501; see also OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S.
CONGRESS, MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK: ELECTRONIC DELIVERY OF FEDERAL SERVICES 144
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ing the debate at least raises the visibility and salience of the issues. It
makes it easier for public interest coalitions to form and reduces the
cost of organization for already stretched pro-privacy organizations.
The linchpin of this approach is to have the government own both
the national ID numbers themselves and the standard by which the in-
formation is readable from the card. Admittedly, this ownership inter-
est in the numbers is not easy to characterize under existing law. As an
intangible form of property, the numbers might seem to be a form of
intellectual property, but this is at best a very imperfect fit.89 Under
current law, even unique ID numbers would not be patentable, 90 copy-
rightable, 91 or trademarkable, 92 nor would they qualify as trade se-
crets.93 Moreover, the much-debated idea of database copyright does
not provide a useful model. In the United States, copyright law cannot
be used to block access to raw data contained in a database unless the
underlying data is entitled to copyright protection on its own. 94 The
(1993) (warning that "extensive computer matching can lead to a 'virtual' national data
bank, even if computer records are not physically centralized in one location").
89 See generally Pamela Samuelson, Questioning Copyrights in Standards, 48 B.C. L. Rv. 193
(2007) (discussing whether Internet standards should be eligible for copyright protection).
90 In 1994 Roger Schlafly obtained U.S. Patent 5,373,560 on two prime numbers. U.S.
Patent No. 5,373,560 (filed Aug. 4, 1993) (issued Dec. 13, 1994). See generally Paul Horowitz
et al., The Law of Prime Numbers, 68 N.YU. L. Riv. 185 (1993) (surveying law relating to
prime numbers). ID-related numbers would not be patentable, however, because if noth-
ing else they lack originality. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("Whoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title."). In any case, patents lapse; this project would require the gov-
ernment's interest to last indefinitely.
91 It would be difficult to characterize an ID number, or even 300 million of them, as
"original works of authorship." See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000).
92 To be protected as a trademark, a mark must be used in "connection with the sale, of-
fering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services." See 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(l)(a) (2000). To the extent that the ID number would be used to identify people, it
runs up against the fact that people are not commodities. Data about people can certainly be
a commodity, but it is hard to characterize an ID number used to authenticate or index data
as being used to "distinguish [] from the goods of others" as meant in 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
93 For starters, the ID number will not be secret.
94 See Assessment Techs. of W1I, LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir.
2003) (holding that copying unoriginal data, however extracted from a database, is not an
infringement of copyright); see also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
348 (1991) (stating that a database is copyrightable only if it "features an original selection
or arrangement" that "possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity").
In 1996, the European Community adopted a Database Directive giving copyright pro-
tection to databases. Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) 20. The Directive
thus conferred a new "sui generis" database right even on unoriginal compilations of facts.
See id.
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U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has even held that num-
bers, by their nature, are too small to be copyrightable. 95
But even if no existing property rule fits, there is no reason why
Congress cannot create a regulatory obligation, either by fiat or by
recognizing a new sui generis property right in the government's-or
the card holder's-interest in the index number created for an ID
card. Without such a rule, be it regulatory or property-based, the only
thing that would prevent the private sector from making full use of
the number would be technological protections encoded on the card.
It would be possible, for example, to make the card hard to read, or
to encrypt the data on the card (including the index number) in a
manner that makes it difficult for unauthorized persons to read. In
fact, however, although these protections are technically feasible, they
are unlikely to be part of any foreseeable national ID card because
they would require special equipment to read the cards. That equip-
ment would have to be available to all the state and federal agencies
relying on the card, and would greatly complicate the use of the card
for governmental purposes. Furthermore, this equipment would have
to be available to airlines, other transportation businesses, and any
other businesses that would be required to check ID under law. It is
far more likely that the government will define a standard, perhaps
attempting to ensure that it has a monopoly on writing data to the
card, but allowing anyone to read the data.
If the holders' personal data is not protected by technical means,
it will either have legal protection or it will have none at all. 96 By cre-
ating a sui generis property interest that it would hold, the govern-
ment would give itself the leverage for a deal: firms that wished to
avail themselves of the cost-saving benefits that using and relying on
the new cards might bring them would have to agree to be bound by
specific data privacy rules, and at the very least would also have to
agree to share their data only with firms that had agreed to be bound
by the same rules. Preferably, the duty to observe the privacy rules
95 See Southco, Inc. v. Kanebridge Corp. (Southco Ill), 390 F.3d 276, 282, 285 (3d Cir.
2004) (en banc) (holding that the petitioner's product numbers were not copyrightable
because they were not "original"-in other words, because each number was rigidly dic-
tated by the rules of the petitioner's system, and they were "analogous to short phrases or
the titles of works"). But see Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in Copyright Law, 74
FORDRAm L. REv. 575, 591-600 (2005) (suggesting that other courts have muddied the
waters on this issue).
96 Contractual protection is a theoretical possibility but not a practical one. For an ar-
gument that consumers likely suffer from privacy myopia, which causes them to under-
value their personal data, see Froomkin, supra note 37, at 1501-05.
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would be made "viral"-it would run with the number. Ordinary li-
censes that permit sublicensing commonly require licensees to pass
on limits in their licenses to the sublicensees. A "viral" license differs
from an ordinary sublicense provision in that, in addition to the sub-
licensor passing on the obligations to future users, the terms of the
viral license purport to run with the subject of the license without the
need for actual consent by either the licensee or the sublicensee. 97
It could be objected that creating a sui generis property right for
the government in ID numbers is an inefficient means to achieve data
privacy, and one that poses the risk of creating a lousy precedent.98 Why
not, the argument goes, simply legislate the privacy rules directly? And
why take the risk of creating (another) 99 sui generis right, thus further
emboldening those who seek to enclose the information commons?
These arguments, legitimate as they are, underestimate the obstacles
that need to be overcome to secure information privacy. Undoubtedly,
direct privacy legislation, whether free-standing or grafted onto REAL
ID, would have many advantages over the market-driven and voluntary
scheme advocated here-immediate universal coverage chief among
them. But despite years of effort by the privacy community, the odds of
direct legislation remain low-and due to REAL ID, time is running out.
Worse, any direct legislation that sought to compel rather than
entice compliance would have to overcome a substantial constitu-
tional obstacle. Although the issue is not free from doubt, there are
substantial reasons to believe that the First Amendment could pose a
significant obstacle to any wide-reaching data privacy law enforced via
compulsion.100 As Eugene Volokh and others have noted, data privacy
law blocks truthful speech about information lawfully acquired, in-
97 Cf Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 IND. L.J.
1125, 1132-33 (2000) (discussing viral contracts). Professor Boyle warns that some people
find the term viral "offensive," James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construc-
tion of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 45 (2003), but I think the meta-
phor fits.
98 Indeed, a number of people, notably Michael Carroll, did object to the idea when I
presented an earlier draft of this Article at the Boston College symposium.
99 Previous sui generis intellectual property rules include the creation of rights in the
word "Olympics," see S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 530
(1987), and the anticircumvention rules of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,
see, e.g., CRAIG JOYcE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW § 9.04[A], at 813 (6th ed. 2003); Dan L.
Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse, 50 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1102-10 (2003).
100 See generally Volokh, supra note 79 (applying several free speech doctrines to pro-
posed information privacy laws).
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formation that may relate to the speaker's own experience.' 0' In con-
trast, promises not to reveal information-including, presumably, the
viral agreements proposed here-are "eminently defensible under
existing free speech doctrine.' '0 2
Precisely what the content of the national privacy protections
should be will be hotly debated. Defining the ID number as the prop-
erty of the government, or as jointly but not severally owned with the
citizen, might cut off private sector attempts to demand that citizens
waive their data protection rights, which I think would plug a major gap
in most existing privacy protection regimes under which consent, even
expressed in a standard form contract, usually vitiates all. More gener-
ally, a sensible national data privacy plan would seek to buy into a full-
blown set of Fair Information Practices. 03 My personal preference is to
require, at a minimum, that the United States commit itself to an up-
dated and improved version of the 1980 Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development privacy guidelines (the "OECD Guide-
lines").104 The OECD Guidelines set out recommendations for nations
concerned about data privacy to "take into account in their domestic
101 See id. at 1050-51; see also Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 283, 308 (2003) (discussing "[t]he perceived conflict between infor-
mational privacy and free speech"); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying
Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 974 (2003) ("[P]rivacy protections
against disclosure, when analyzed in light of our longstanding tradition of protecting free
speech and a free press, seem quite problematic.").
102 Volokh, supra note 79, at 1057; see Cohen x: Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 672
(1991) (holding that the First Amendment does not prohibit a plaintiff from recovering
damages from a newspaper for breach of a promise of confidentiality).
103 See Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006
U. ILL. L. REv. 357, 358, 368-82; see also FED. TRADE COMM'N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT
TO CONGRESS 7-10 (1998) (noting that contemporary Fair Information Practice codes all
contain five core principles of privacy protection: (1) Notice/Awareness, (2) Choice/
Consent, (3) Access/Participation, (4) Integrity/Security, and (5) Enforcement/Redress).
104 ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., RECOMMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL CON-
CERNING GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOwS OF
PERSONAL DATA (1980) [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES], available at http://www.oecd.org/
doctInient/18/0,2340,en 2649_34255_1815186_1_1_11,00.html. On the OECD Guidelines,
see Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry Doesn't
Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 44-47, http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/01_
STLR1 /index.htm.
The OECD is a group of thirty countries that, among other things, issues publications
and statistics on economic and social issues and produces internationally agreed-upon
instruments, decisions, and recommendations. See Organisation for Economic Co-
operation & Development, About OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/0,2337,en_2649_
201185_1_1_1_11,00.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2006).
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legislation," subject only to the minimum limits necessary to preserve
national security. 105 The OECD Guidelines require, in part, the following:
" Data should be collected with the knowledge or consent of the
data subject; 106
" Data should only be collected when relevant to the purpose for
which the data are being used; 10 7
" The purpose for which data are collected should be stated at the
time of collection, and the data should only be used for that stated
purpose; 108
" When retained, data should be kept accurate, up-to-date, and pro-
tected by reasonable security safeguards; 0 9
" Persons have the right to know who holds data about them, and
to inspect it;110 and
" Persons have the right to challenge data as inaccurate and "if the
challenge is successful to have the data erased, rectified, com-
pleted or amended.""'
Although they are far more demanding than most current na-
tional privacy practices, the OECD Guidelines have been criticized as
too weak. t" 2 And, indeed, in some ways they are showing their age.
One right that surely needs to be added today is the right to know
when data held about a person has been compromised-hacked,
leaked, lost, or stolen. An increasing number of states have rules re-
quiring disclosure of data security breaches," 3 rules needed to allow
people to take steps to protect themselves against identity theft."14
105 See generally OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 104.
106 Id. 7.
107 Id. 8.
108 Id. 9, 10.
109 Id. 1 8, 11.
110 OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 104, 7 12, 13.
111 Id. I 13(d).
112 See Gary T. Marx, Ethics for the New Surveillance, in VISIONS OF PRIVACY: POLICY
CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 39, 41-42 (ColinJ. Bennett & Rebecca Grant eds., 1999).
113 The original and, in many ways, model law is California's. See CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 1798.29 (West 2006).
114 Cf Quinn Norton, Porn Biller Says It Was Framed, WIRED NEWS, Mar. 9, 2006,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70380-0.htinl (reporting that a private data
security firm uncovered the stolen consumer records of 18 million individuals, originally
thought to be customers of iBill, an online payment company).
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III. REAL ID ON THE HORIZON-SETTING THE WRONG STANDARD
Without much thought about the consequences for privacy (or
for several other things), last year Congress passed the REAL ID Act
of 2005, which set up a national standard for the issuance of state
driver's licenses. 115 Unless the statute is amended (or struck down as
an unfunded mandate), 116 the state identity documents produced as a
result of this command will be better authenticated and contain more
personal data than any previous general-use government-issued cre-
dential in U.S. history.117 These new REAL ID-compliant cards will
probably become de facto national ID cards. At present, there is no
sign that the private sector will be prevented from using the cards for
authentication or data indexing. Thus, even if the new cards do not
become full national ID cards, businesses will find these new cards to
be such close substitutes for national ID cards as to close any existing
window for an ID/privacy deal. Once these cards are ubiquitous,
businesses will have access to a credential that provides strong authen-
tication, and an index number, without having to commit to any im-
provement in their privacy practices.
Under REAL ID, starting on May 11, 2008, "a Federal agency may
not accept, for any official purpose, a driver's license or identification
card issued by a State to any person unless" that state credential com-
plies with technical standards issued by the Department of Homeland
Security.118 Although it will not be federally issued, the new federally
defined ID card will become a practical necessity for anyone wishing
to "travel on an airplane, open a bank account, collect Social Security
payments, or take advantage of nearly any government service." 119
REAL ID requires that states comply with extensive rules about
how they issue driver's licenses, and defines in some detail what in-
115 REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, 119 Stat. 231, 302. Title II of REAL
ID, "Improved Security for Drivers' Licenses and Personal Identification Cards," lays out
requirements for new state ID cards. See div. B, tit. II, 119 Stat. at 311 (codified at 49
U.S.C.A. § 30301 note (2006)).
116 See Suzanne Gamboa, Senator Slams New Driver's License Rules, SFGATE.COM, May 10, 2005,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/05/10/national/w55857D84.DTL
(noting that the National Governors Association is considering a challenge to REAL ID on the
ground that it is an unfunded mandate).
117 See generally REAL ID Act.
118 Id. § 202(a), 119 Stat. at 312. The Secretary of Homeland Security may extend this
deadline. Id. § 205(b), 119 Stat. at 315. And he will.
119 Declan McCullagh, FAQ: How REAL ID Will Affect You, CINET NEWS.cOM, May 6,
2005, http://news.com.com/2102-1028_3-5697111.html.
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formation those licenses must contain. 120 Before issuing a driver's li-
cense that will qualify as valid under REAL ID, the states will have to
require and verify the applicant's documentation 121 -either a photo
identity document or a non-photo identity document that contains
both the applicant's full legal name and date of birth. 122 States must
verify the applicant's name, primary address, date of birth and SSN
(or proof of Social Security ineligibility). 123 What is more, REAL ID
obliges states to verify the correctness and uniqueness of the SSN. t24
States may not accept any foreign document other than an official
passport.125 And they can only issue driver's licenses to citizens, per-
manent residents, certain asylum seekers, and the holders of particu-
lar types of visas. 126
When issued, the license must contain the holder's actual ad-
dresses (rather than a post office box), full legal name, date of birth,
gender, signature, and driver's license number, and it also must contain
a digital photo of the person's face. 127 In addition, the card will have to
include physical security features (to be defined by the Department of
Homeland Security), designed to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, or
120 See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(b)-(d), 119 Stat. 231, 312-15.
121 Id. § 202(c)(1), (d)(4), 119 Stat. at 312-13, 314. The statute also imposes substan-
tial record-keeping requirements on the states:
" States must retain digital images of identity source documents in electronic stor-
age in a transferable format, id. § 202(d) (1), 119 Stat. at 314;
" States must retain paper copies of sotrce documents for a minimum of seven years
or images of source documents for a minimum of ten years, id. § 202(d) (2), 119
Stat. at 314; and
" States must maintain a state motor vehicle database that contains: (A) all data
fields printed on driver's licenses and IDs issued by the state; and (B) motor ve-
hicle drivers' histories, including motor vehicle violations, suspensions, and
points on license. Id. § 202(d)(13), 119 Stat. at 315. This database must be
shared with other states. Id. § 202(d) (12), 119 Stat. at 315.
122 Id. § 202(c) (1) (A), 119 Stat. at 313.
123 Id. § 202(c) (1) (B)-(D), 119 Stat. at 313.
124 See id. § 202(c) (3) (A), 119 Stat. at 314. In the event an SSN already is registered to
or associated with another person to whom any state has issued a driver's license or ID, the
state shall resolve the discrepancy and take appropriate action. Id. § 202(d) (5), 119 Stat.
314.
125 Id. § 202(c) (3) (B), 119 Stat. at 314.
126 See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 202(c) (2) (B), 119 Stat. 231, 314.
The list of visa classes that qualify for a driver's license is noticeably shorter than the list of
visa types that permit long-term residence and even employment in the United States. See 8
C.ER. §§ 204, 205, 212, 214, 244 (2006). This is likely to cause serious problems.
127 REAL ID Act § 202(b), (d) (3), 119 Stat. at 312, 314.
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duplication. 128 REAL ID also tries to ensure that driver's licenses will be
a unique credential. If a person presents an out-of-state driver's license
as ID, the issuing state will have to confirm that the out-of-state license
is being terminated before issuing a new one.129
For most states, REAL ID means a significant, and expensive, 13 0
change from current procedures. And the states have claimed that
REAL ID's May 2008 deadline is unrealistic. 131 The Department of
Homeland Security has the power to waive that deadline for cause,
but it is unclear how willing the Department will be to use it. 132 In any
event, whether the effective date is 2008 or a few years later, it seems
very likely that once enough states start issuing REAL ID-compliant
credentials, the IDs will become at least very close substitutes for a
national ID card.
Worse, REAL ID specifies that licenses will have to be machine-
readable by a "common machine-readable technology"-a technology
that has not yet been defined by the Department of Homeland Secu-
rity.133 It is likely, however, that this technology will be available to the
private sector as well as to governmental users.134 And because the IDs
will become standardized around one mandated technology, the cost
of license-reading technology will decrease, thereby lowering the cost
barrier to the collection and storage of the holders' personal data by
private parties. Once this takes off, whatever hope there may be to
leverage even a moderately benign privacy rule off the creation of a
standardized national ID card will evaporate.
128 Id. § 202(b)(8), 119 Stat. at 312; see id. § 205(a), 119 Stat. at 315 (granting the Sec-
retary of Homeland Security the authority to issue regulations under REAL ID).
129 Id. § 202(d) (6), 119 Stat. at 314.
130 Estimates of the total cost for all states together range from $100 million to $260
million. See Jared Joyce-Schleimer, Current Development, The State of the REAL 1D Act of
2005, 19 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 612-13 (2005).
131 § 202(a)(1), 119 Stat. at 312; see NAT'L GOVERINORS Ass'N ET AL., THE REAL ID
ACT: NATIONAL IMPACT ANALYSIS 2 (2006), available at http://ww.nga.org/Files/pdf/
0609REALID.pdf.
132 See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 205(b), 119 Stat. 231, 315.
133 Id. § 202(b) (9), 119 Stat. at 312.
134 This is already being criticized:
This will, of course, make identity theft easier. Assume that this information
will be collected by bars and other businesses, and that it will be resold to
companies like ChoicePoint and Acxiom. It actually doesn't matter how well
the states and federal government protect the data on driver's licenses, as
there will be parallel commercial databases with the same information.
Schneier on Security, http://www.schneier.com/blog (May 9, 2005, 09:06 EST).
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CONCLUSION
Some form of national ID card now seems inevitable, be it a "vir-
tual" card, REAL ID-based driver's license, or federally issued docu-
ment.'3 5 At present, we are on track for cards that both lack privacy
protections and fail to address the ways in which the cards will be in-
tegrated with new and existing databases. Most likely, these new cards
will be used not only for authentication but also as the index around
which databases of personal data will be organized. Once a standard
becomes dominant in the marketplace, it will be hard to change; ex-
perience suggests it will also be hard to regulate.
The time for new legislation-or an amendment to REAL ID-is
now, before other standards become entrenched in the marketplace.
We live in a last, brief moment of opportunity: absent fairly unlikely
legislation forbidding the use of alternatives, privacy rules can suc-
cessfully piggyback on a national ID system only if private sector data
users decide that it is in their economic interest to use the new cre-
dential. A single reliable identifier should be of considerable interest
to most private sector data users, as the alternatives that exist today
are unreliable because of data quality problems and because the data
is difficult to sort reliably, at least without expense. At present, the
economics may still allow an opportunity for a deal. It seems all but
certain that five years from now this will no longer be true.
The introduction of a new standard REAL ID has created an op-
portunity for the federal government to use its power creatively. The
carrot of lower transaction costs dangled by easy, secure, reliable, and
cheap identification might suffice to create market-based incentives
for businesses to accept the stick of adherence to substantive privacy
conditions. By defining a standard for data access and numbering,
and by retaining ownership of the standard and especially the data,
the government could give itself the leverage to offer a deal to firms
desiring to take advantage of the new credential. A ubiquitous and
reliable numbering system should be very attractive to businesses, and
they might be willing to accept the obligations of Fair Information
Practices as the price of admission. Making the privacy program for-
mally voluntary, in the sense that only those who used the new cards
or the new numbers would be required to follow the privacy standard,
would also make it more likely to be politically acceptable.
135 As I noted at the outset, a full weighing of the costs and benefits of national ID
cards requires looking at the public sector uses of the card as well.
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One important consequence of this proposal is that it would cen-
tralize and nationalize the data privacy debate. Although there have
been successes, the explosion of privacy-destroying technologies within
the last two decades suggests pretty strongly that standards and prac-
tices unfriendly to data privacy are being set more quickly and in more
places than the privacy community can handle. A perverse advantage of
a centralized national ID regime would be that it would create a very
visible, single target for debate about privacy regulation. This is only a
mixed blessing, for centralization also allows the interests that tend to
oppose restrictions on the use of personal data to unite their lobbying
efforts in one massive push for the goldfish bowl society.136
An invitation to a debate, by definition, offers only an uncertain
outcome. But without this debate, at present the outcome seems all
too certain, and it will be ugly.
136 For a particularly evocative vision of what that might be like, see generally DAVID
BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY (1998).
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